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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
In the following pages, three well-known Latinoamericanists 
share their views on the current prospects for coups in Latin 
America.  They are:  Rut Diamint of the University 
Torcuatto de Tella in Buenos Aires, Argentina; Pablo 
Policzer of the University of Calgary in Canada; and Michael 
Shifter of the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington, DC.  
Each looks at the potential for coups from different 
perspectives but, all three come to similar conclusions.  That 
is, that despite substantial gains in democracy, the threat of 
coups in Latin America remains latent.  
 
The authors agree that democracy is growing in the region.  
Opinion surveys such as the Americas Barometer 
consistently show that citizens in Latin America have 
gradually incorporated democracy as part of their core value 
system.  Yet, the authors argue convincingly that Latin 
America faces new types of interruptions to its democratic 
process that should be considered coups, even if not 
following the traditional style of military coup that 
predominated in the past.  Situations that have taken place in 
Peru, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Honduras and other countries 
serve to illustrate the new trends.  
 
More specifically, Professor Diamint argues that in Latin 
America a culture of intolerance, demonization of the 
opposition, and the utilization of any method to achieve 
power prevails.  In a region with a very high threshold of 
violence, governments fail to set an example of establishing 
a culture of debate, consensus, and transparency.  This 
culture is inclined to uncontrollable political expressions, 
preferring confrontational means to resolve conflict.  Within 
this scenario, ―messianic‖ solutions are promoted and coups 
cannot be discarded as an option that would never transpire.  
 
Professor Policzer looks more closely to the constitutional 
loopholes that allow for a transformation of limited into 
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absolute power.  He argues that coups can be constitutional 
or unconstitutional, and that a constitutional coup can occur 
when violations to democracy actually stem from the 
constitutions themselves.  In Honduras, for example, specific 
provisions in the constitution itself created conditions for a 
constitutional crisis; similar provisions have also led to 
constitutional authoritarianism in Venezuela and other 
countries.  Dr. Policzer stresses that when a head of state or 
the military take absolute power, even temporarily, based on 
provisions in their constitutions; they are in essence staging a 
constitutional coup.  These blind spots in constitutions, he 
argues, may be a more serious threat to democracy than that 
of traditional coups.  
 
Lastly, Dr. Shifter argues that some kind of coup should be 
expected in Latin America in coming years, not only because 
fundamental institutions remain weak in some countries, but 
because the regional political environment is less prepared to 
respond effectively to transgressions than it was a few years 
ago.   The good news, however, is that only a handful of 
countries are at risk, and that the militaries, even in those 
countries, show no interest in governing.  The bad news is 
that in those few countries where situations are indeed shaky, 
they are also in some cases aggravated by rising food and 
fuel prices, and spreading criminality, which pose serious 
risks to the rule of law and democratic governance. 
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A new era of coup d’états in  
Latin america? 
 
Prof. Rut Diamint 
University torcuatto de tella (argentina) 
 
The third wave of democracy had a positive impact on Latin 
America. Since 1979, when Ecuador put an end to its 
traditional coup d’états, a domino effect occurred as various 
countries experienced transitions from authoritarian regimes 
to democracies, with Chile in 1990 closing that cycle. The 
June 2009, coup in Honduras ended the predominant belief 
that this form of political rupture had been eliminated in the 
region.  
 
It is true that prior to this, several governments experienced 
hurdles that many feared heralded the beginnings of despotic 
reversals, such as  in Haiti (June 1988 and September 1991); 
Peru (April 1992); Venezuela (led by Hugo Chavez in 1992); 
Guatemala (May 1993); Paraguay (April 1996) and 
Venezuela (2002). These events, in one hand, ascribed the 
instability to the inability of democracy to flourish in these  
countries, as happened with the abrupt end of governments 
in Ecuador (1997, 2000, 2005); in Argentina (2001); and in 
Bolivia (2003 and 2005). Yet, these events were handled 
within institutional frameworks that also allowed observers 
to reaffirm that Latin American democracies were relatively 
strong. This was so because the countries re-established 
political practices within the norms of their respective 
systems. Even pessimistic observers argued that the 
constitutional violations of the past were no longer a viable 
alternative. Nevertheless, they took place again in Honduras 
and later in Ecuador.  Thus, it is worth to ask if we are 
witnessing the beginning of a new cycle of institutional 
ruptures.  Several governments are promoting social and 
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political discord, which could lead to breakdowns and 
dangerous confrontations that would threaten democratic 
regimes. Then, are we facing a new era of coup d’états?     
 
DEFINING THE TERMS 
 
The French term coup d’état refers to a violent and illegal 
action used by a ruler to concentrate power and deny it from 
his enemies. The concept was first used in 18
th
 century 
France to characterize a series of measures taken by the king 
outside of any legislative procedural requirements and was 
justified by the need to preserve the security of the state or 
common welfare of its citizens. In the 19
th
 century, it still 
referred to actions carried out by a chief of government to 
increase his power or control Parliament. That is why it is 
also referred to as ―palace coups‖ or ―institutional coups‖. 
 
Napoleon Bonaparte‘s 18 Brumaire‘s coup has been 
considered as the beginning of the modern coup d’état. 
Although Bonaparte carried a palace coup, he gave the term 
new meaning when he relied on the support of the military. 
Curzio Malaparte, in his classic work on coup d’états, 
pointed out that for Napoleon ―the art of conquering power 
was an essentially military art: the strategies and tactics of 
war applied to political struggle.‖1 From there on the coup 
d’état model changed; since the 20th century its definition 
evolved into rebellions led by military personnel or civilians 
allied with the armed forces. 
 
The abrupt and illegal takeover by the Armed Forces and its 
allies has been common throughout Latin American history. 
As Narcis Serra reminds us, ―A common characteristic of all 
Latin American countries is that the transition to democracy 
took place, without exceptions, from military regimes.‖2     
                                                 
1
 Curzio Malaparte (1934) Técnica del Golpe de Estado (Santiago, Chile, 
Editorial Zig-Zag), p. 95.  
2
 Narcis Serra i Serra, ―El estado: papel de las fuerzas armadas y de 
seguridad. Notas sobre su control democrático,‖ Instituto Interamericano  
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Yet,   there is also a modern version of the coup d’état.   It is 
characterized by the use of violence by authoritarian regimes 
against its own citizens.   These regimes attempt to annul 
political expression, monopolize the media, impose 
ideologies, utilize the secret police to spy on people and use 
illegal means to neutralize enemies. 
  
The prologue of Curzio Malaparte‘s book on coup d‘états 
contains a phrase that is as valid today as it was in 1931. His 
goal was to examine ―the struggle between the defenders of 
the principles of freedom and democracy -in other words- the 
defenders of the parliamentary state and its enemies.‖3 
Today, we could retranslate these precepts as a struggle 
between republican democracy and plebiscitary democracy.  
Now ruptures and instability are more similar to palace coup 
d’états than previous ones and also are the result of eclectic 
alliances with more sophisticated forms of concentration of 
power.      
 
OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES? 
 
To analyze whether we are facing new forms of institutional 
breakdowns or in reality, witnessing a new cycle of the old 
coups from the past, we will examine the case of Honduras. 
Whether or not a coup d’état took place in Honduras in 
2009, generated multiple discussions.  There is enough 
evidence that proves that it was a coup.  Among them, the 
search-warrant ordered by the Supreme Court charging 
President Manuel Zelaya for abuse of authority, crimes 
against the government and treason against the fatherland, 
was never found. Also, the siege to the Brazilian Embassy 
was a clear violation of immunities and guarantees 
established by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations.   
                                                                                                    
de Derechos Humanos, s/f, 
htttp://www.iidh.ed.cr/comunidades/seguridad/docs/seg_docfuerzas/el%2
0estado%20el%20papel%20de%20las%20faaa.pdf. p. 1. 
3
  Curzio Malaparte, Técnica del Golpe de Estado, p. 5.  
6 
 
In documents disclosed by Wikileaks, the U.S. Ambassador 
in Tegucigalpa, Hugo Llorens, reported to his government 
that:  ―The position of the Embassy is that, without any 
doubts, the military, the Supreme Court of Justice and the 
National Congress conspired on June 28
th
 in what constitutes 
an illegal and unconstitutional coup against the Executive 
power, although it could be argued that Zelaya could have 
acted illegally and violated the Constitution… It was a coup 
d’état against the Executive power. At the same time, we 
have no doubts that the coming to power by Roberto 
Micheletti was illegitimate.‖4     
 
In addition, Frank La Rue, Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression from the United Nations, pointed 
out on his report: ―Free demonstrations by those who 
opposed the coup d’état and demand the return of President 
Zelaya are not allowed, they are immediately confronted 
with direct repressive mechanisms by security forces.‖5   
Moreover, he added: ―Cameramen and photographers who 
would like to document the events have been a specific 
target of police aggression, suffering blows, confiscation 
and/or destruction of their cameras or filmed footage. 
Several of them personally showed me the physical evidence 
of bruises on their bodies.‖6  These independent expressions 
leave no doubts as to the authoritarian and repressive nature 
of the government which forcefully replaced Zelaya. 
 
                                                 
4
 ―Brasil y golpe de Estado en Honduras, entre filtraciones de 
Wikileaks‖, El Tiempo, (Bogotá, January 12, 2011); ―Wikileaks filtró 
texto que revela que EU consideró ilegal golpe en Honduras,‖ 
Univisión.com, (New York, November 29, 2010).  
5
  Frank La Rue, Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of 
the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Speech, Special Report on Freedom 
of Opinion and Speech of the United Nations Organization, Press 
Release on the visit to Honduras by Rapporteur, United Nations 
Organizations, August 10, 2009, pp.1-2.  
6
 Idem, p. 2.  
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Others who did not want to characterize the ousting of 
President Manuel Zelaya as a coup, offered superficial 
explanations. For example, Jorge Salaverry, former 
Ambassador and visiting research fellow at the Heritage 
Foundation, argued: ―By the midterm of his presidency, 
Zelaya began to take a surprisingly turn to the populist left 
that raised red flags within his party, a traditional right wing 
party, and triggered concerns from Hondurans in general.‖7 
Still, Salaverry failed to point out that in a democracy, 
suffrage is the method to punish those who betray a party or 
citizens.  
 
Nonetheless, Ambassador Salaverry is correct in adding an 
important point to the debate regarding current political 
processes in various Latin American countries. He refers to a 
decree issued by President Zelaya on June 25, 2009 that 
called for a national referendum on June 28 to ask the 
following question: ―Do you agree with adding a fourth 
ballot box for the 2009 general elections which will allow 
the people to decide on calling for a National Constituent 
Assembly?‖ Salaverry explains the intentions behind this 
apparent way of exercising direct democracy.
8
   This leads 
into the debate between representative democracy and 
plebiscitary democracy. 
 
In a plebiscitary democracy, a leader, supported by a 
political apparatus, seeks direct links to the people, 
weakening the role of institutions. In these situations, the 
leader-- who already became a caudillo-- is elected on a 
personal platform and entrusted with all power. Other actors 
or institutions are neglected and only the people give 
legitimacy to his power.
9
  But, citizens do not express 
                                                 
7
  Jorge Salaverry  ―Honduras: Golpe de Estado, u Homenaje a 
Montesquieu?‖ Fundación Ciudadanía y Valores, September,  2009.p. 4.   
8
  Idem,  p. 6. 
9
  Catherine Conaghan and Carlos de la Torre  ―The Permanent 
Campaign of Rafael Correa: Making Ecuador‘s Plebiscitary Presidency,‖ 
in The International Journal of Press/Politics, 2008, 13 (3) pp. 267-284; 
Aníbal Pérez-Liñan, Juicio político al presidente y nueva 
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themselves through established constitutional channels; 
instead, they do it through inorganic and non-
institutionalized movements. These combinations of strong 
presidents within weak institutional contexts could be one of 
the main threats to liberal and pluralist democracy. In many 
occasions, the coup is heralded as a natural exit process to 
the continuous mistakes committed by a head of state. The 
coup participants claim to be saviors of the national identity: 
Messiahs claiming to embody popular will and interpret it 
according to their personal interests.  
 
In contrast, a democratic state of rule of law calls for 
effective monopoly of violence but to not use it in an 
arbitrary manner, but submit it to the laws and regulations. 
Violence (and to take the president, wearing pajamas at 
night, out of the country is without any doubts an act of 
political violence) is an attack against existing norms. The 
lukewarm critique of some countries, the limited scope of 
action available to multilateral organizations and the 
subsequent oblivion of this political drama -in other words- 
the refusal to denounce the coup d’état and to act 
accordingly, is a terrible precedent for the Panamerican 
community. Although the assault on power that deviated 
from institutionalized norms was recognized, failing to act 
effectively had and will have a high cost when attempting to 
avoid similar antidemocratic adventures in the future.   
 
POLITICAL DETERIORATION AND LEGITIMACY  
   
We have witnessed other forms of political violations that 
represent forebodings regarding Latin American democratic 
systems. As Juan Linz explained in 1978, legitimacy is 
strengthened by the personal charisma of a leader, but what 
counts is the legitimacy given by laws and state institutions 
                                                                                                    
institucionalidad política en América Latina (Buenos Aires: Fondo de 
Cultura Económica, 2009); Carlos de la Torre y Enrique Peruzzotti, El 
retorno del pueblo: Populismo y nuevas democracias en América Latina 
(Quito: FLACSO/Ecuador y Ministerio de Cultura, 2008).   
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which guarantee obedience by subordinates.10  In de facto 
governments, this obedience is achieved through the armed 
forces monopoly on the use of force. But, what happens 
when legitimacy is almost exclusively achieved through a 
patronage system?  Could we understand the attempted 2010 
coup d’état in Ecuador in these terms?   
 
The Ecuadorian police became a powerful agency, involved 
in many areas beyond its exclusive responsibility such as 
transit, customs, migration, and drug trafficking. It 
eventually achieved economic power similar to the Armed 
Forces. The police became a political actor.11 Its claims 
seemed to be linked to sinecures and benefits. 
 
The Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador 
(CONAIE) and the Pachakutik Bloc that represents 
indigenous and peasant groups issued a statement rejecting 
the idea of a coup d’état. Given its history and broad level of 
representation, they deserve to be taken into account: “We 
energetically affirmed that there was never an attempted 
coup d’état, even less an abduction, but an event that 
responded to mistaken policies by the government which 
results in popular discontent, due to the permanent 
aggressions, discrimination and violations of human rights 
granted through Constitutional norms.”12 In another 
paragraph, they added: “We do not recognize ‘this dictatorial 
democracy,’ due to its lack of freedom of expression, the 
abduction of all state powers by the executive in its political 
system of one government, which does not generate spaces 
to discuss bills elaborated by indigenous movements and 
                                                 
10  Juan Linz, La quiebra de las democracias (Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 
1987), pp. 37-40.  
11  Hernán Ramos, “La política como nuevo actor político,” Clarín 
(Buenos Aires), October 1, 2010.  
12  “CONAIE; El supuesto golpe de estado, la democracia y las 
organizaciones indígenas,” Quito, October 6, 2010. 
htttp://nasaacin.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1
027:conaie-el-supuesto-golpe-de-estado-lademocracia-y-las-
organizaciones-indígenas&catid=:noticias-generales&itemid=84. 
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other social sectors.‖13 The dilemma of the legitimacy of a 
leader or of laws and state institutions as pointed out by Linz 
reappears. 
 
The international reaction in defense of democracy was 
quick and forceful. In a matter of hours, the Permanent 
Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) 
called for a meeting, and five presidents of UNASUR met in 
Buenos Aires to support the Ecuadorian democracy, 
although it was never confirmed whether a coup d’état had 
taken place. It was evident that challenges to institutions 
through illegal acts, such as the closing of the international 
airport carried out by government officials and members of 
the military, received severe international sanctions.
14
  It was 
also evident that conflicts are still solved through arbitrary 
means, resulting in injuries and deaths.         
 
Actions framed in this same type of resistance against 
governments have taken place in other countries of the 
region. Bolivian president, Evo Morales, also denounced an 
attempted coup d’état at the United Nations General 
Assembly, declaring that: ―I want my fellow presidents to 
know that last year there was also an attempted coup d’état 
in Bolivia. Thanks to labor unions and the participation of 
the international community, especially of UNASUR, we 
were able to stop this civilian, not military, coup d’état in my 
country.  Around this time last year in September [2008], a 
coup d’état failed.‖15 In reality, the Bolivian president has 
denounced his opponents as participants in coup d’états on 
various occasions. The first time was in 2003 when some 
governors rebelled against Morales‘ orders. The situation 
was repeated in 2008 when he accused ―fascist and terrorist 
paramilitary groups‖ of the prefectures and civic committees 
                                                 
13
  Idem. 
14
  ―Golpe de Estado en Ecuador?,‖ Reporte Confidencial, El Semanario, 
October 10-17, 2010. 153.  
15
  Speech by Mr. Evo Morales Ayma, President of Bolivia, during the 
general debate at the 64
th
 Session of the United Nations General 
Assembly, September 23, 2009.  
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of the so called Half Moon region (Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni 
and Pando) for carrying out an atypical coup d’état.16 
Morales also accused the Spanish Popular Party of 
supporting a coup d’état against his government through a 
foundation (FAES) in Bolivia.
17
   
 
Argentina‘s president also spoke about an attempted coup 
when referring to the showdown with his country‘s rural 
sectors in 2008. President Cristina Fernández said: ―I have 
seen again the face of a past that seems to be wanting to 
return…This time they have not come accompanied by 
tanks, this time they have been accompanied by some 
multimedia ‗generals‘, who in addition to supporting the 
lockout of the people, have carried out a lockout of 
information by changing, twisting and showing only one 
side.‖18  Her Minister of Economics, Amado Boudou, said 
that the government of President Fernández suffered two 
attempted coup d’états. The first one with Resolution 125 
(retention of agricultural goods in 2008) and the second one 
with the struggle over the Central Bank reserves, during the 
summer of 2010, when they wanted the state to increase its 
debt. 
19
 
 
In Nicaragua, President Daniel Ortega submitted an appeal to 
the Supreme Court of Justice, claiming legal inequality in 
order to request the annulment of a law preventing him from 
running for the presidency, again on the basis that the 
Constitution violated his rights as a citizen. After three 
                                                 
16
  Rosa Rojas, ―En Bolivia, en marcha un golpe de estado atípico, 
denuncia Evo Morales,‖ El Universal, (Mexico), September 11, 2010. 
17
  ―Morales acusa en Madrid al PP de estar detrás de un golpe de Estado 
en Bolivia,‖ El Mundo, (Madrid, Spain), May 18, 2010. 
18
  Ernesto Tenenbaum, ―Verguenza ajena,‖ Revista Veintitrés, (Buenos 
Aires), May 6, 2010; ―Cristina Kirchner relaciona a los huelguistas con el 
golpe de Estado de 1976,‖ Diario Público, (Madrid), April 2, 2008.  
19
  ―Dos intentos de Golpe de Estado,‖ La política on line, (Buenos 
Aires), Septermber 9, 2010, 
http://www.lapoliticaonline.com/noticias/val/67913/dos-intentos -de-
golpe-de-estado-.html. 
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judges of the opposition of the Constitutional Court left at 
the end of the day, the other three judges affiliated to the 
Sandinista party called three other Sandinista judges from 
other court houses to vote on Ortega‘s request.   In their 
decision, they argued that the article of the Constitution 
forbidding re-election was non-applicable. The tribunal 
―allowed him to nominate himself to the presidency in 
2011.‖20  This institutional coup allowed the Nicaraguan 
president to concentrate more power and to be re-elected for 
a third time, reminding us of Malaparte‘s description. 
 
In these cases, more that coup attempts, the leader uses the 
ghost of past coups to attack the opposition. Why does this 
happen?  Is it because there is a memory of horror of past 
coups or, on the contrary, does it respond to the eternal 
fragility of democracy?  Without underestimating the 
corrosive instability job performed by many antagonists—
who generally are the same that have the economic and 
multimedia power—invoking coups is a spurious political 
resource. These attempts to limits the political activity, 
demonize leaders, and promote hatred cannot lead to good 
democratic governability.  
                      
POLITICAL CULTURE, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY 
 
Democratic culture is not achieved in one game. Countries 
that now enjoy cohesive political systems have achieved 
democratic progress after huge social conflicts, intense 
divisions, and profound exclusions. In Latin America, the 
political culture inherited from so many years of 
authoritarianism and impregnated with fear, still exists.  
Order instead of freedom; discipline and hierarchy. 
Disciplining social relations demands a privatization of 
                                                 
20
  Mary Anastasia O‘Grady, ―Dónde está la indignación internacional 
frente a Daniel Ortega?,‖ Wall Street Journal, February 22, 2010, 
reproduced by Cato Institute, http://www.elcato.org/donde-esta-
laindignacion-internacional-frente-daniel-ortega.   
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power.
21
  Threatening with the ghost of the coup d’état, both 
by those in power as well as the opposition, seeks to scare 
the citizens and isolate him in the face of potential chaos.     
 
Francis Fukuyama argues that ―political culture varies 
among different people and regions and through time; it is 
influenced not only by symbolic forces like religion but also 
by historical experiences like wars or economic crisis and is 
crucial to understand why some formal political institutions 
function and others do not.‖22   That culture inclined to 
dramatic solutions, which erase the past and continuously 
reestablishes the ―the nation‘s‖ foundation is rooted in 
military institutions. The incomplete control of the armed 
forces opened a window of opportunity for their return as 
saviors of the fatherland. In addition, this failed civil 
supremacy also allowed for the armed forces to be re-
politicized and to be used as a political party ally for new 
political projects. This will work until the military consider 
that they want to be protagonists for change. But this culture 
is also rooted in political leaders. Their careers are 
determined by territorial power. To reassert themselves, they 
resort to caudillo-like practices such as political vengeance 
or, if necessary, palace coups. There are very few Latin 
American nations where the principle of freedom and 
democracy, the Parliamentarian state, is a shared consensus, 
and it is respected by the political elite. Citizens emerge from 
societies where rule of law is respected.        
 
We are witnessing with consternation an unceasing increase 
of violence that results in the beheading of citizens in 
Mexico, territorial control of neighborhoods in Rio de 
                                                 
21
  José Joaquín Brunner (1982) ―La cultura política del autoritarismo,‖ 
Revista Mexicana de Sociología, (Vol. 44, No. 2, Apr-Jun, (Mexico, 
National Autnomous University of Mexico) pp. 550-575.   
22
  Francis Fukuyama (2008) ―Do defective institutions explain the 
development gap between the United States and Latin America? In 
Francis Fukuyama, editor (2008) Falling behind. Explaining the 
development gap between Latin America and the United States (Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press), p. 213.  
14 
 
Janeiro, and that frustrates authorities in El Salvador and 
Honduras. Behind this violence, there is no poverty but 
inequality and a strong correlation between the rates of 
political and criminal violence. In Latin America, the 
threshold of violence is higher than in other societies on the 
world.  Governments fail to set an example by establishing a 
culture of debate, consensus, and transparency. On the 
contrary, the culture of intolerance, demonization of the 
opposition and the utilization of any method to achieve 
power prevails. This culture is inclined to disproportionate 
political expressions. It accepts that the resolution of 
conflicts and the response to demands should be through 
confrontational means. Within this scenario, redeeming, 
messianic and mythical solutions are promoted. Among 
these solutions, the assault on power cannot be discarded.  
 
Indexes of support for democracy in Latin America are not 
negative.
23
  Nevertheless, social and political condemnations 
of political adventurisms have been practically absent. 
Against this environment of intransigence and 
preponderance, we should not be surprised that coup d’états 
will continue taking place in Latin America.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
                                                 
23
  See, Mitchell A. Seligson and Amy Erica Smith (editors) (2010). 
―Political Culture of Democracy, 2010. Democratic Consolidation in the 
Americas in Hard Times: report on the Americas,‖ Americas Barometer, 
Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), (Nashville, Tennessee, 
Vanderbilt University).   
15 
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Coups in Latin America: 
Old and New Threats 
 
Prof. Pablo Policzer 
University of Calgary (Canada) 
  
Democracy has a stronger foothold in Latin America today 
than in the past, when elections were rare and power in some 
countries regularly changed hands through coups. Over the 
past generation countries in the region and international 
organizations such as the Organization of American States 
(OAS) have enshrined protections to strengthen democratic 
regimes. Democratic transfers of power are the norm, and 
democracy is entrenched as a fundamental value. Yet a 
number of crises in recent years have raised new fears about 
the strength of democratic safeguards, and even about the 
renewed threat of coups. In this brief I will argue that this 
threat requires focusing on undemocratic elements embedded 
in many countries‘ constitutions, as well as defining coups in 
a novel way. 
 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUP 
 
What is a coup? In the standard view, a coup is a blow 
against democratic constitutional government. In a classic 
and oft-cited treatise, Edward Luttwak defines a coup as an 
illegal seizure of power.
24
 Similarly, Maxwell Cameron 
argues that ―a coup is, by definition, a change in the 
constitutional order by non-constitutional means.‖25 This 
change can include the overthrow of a democratically elected 
president by the military (as in Chile in 1973), as well as the 
                                                 
24
 Edward Luttwak, Coup d’État: A Practical Handbook (Harvard 
University Press, 1968). 
25
 Maxwell Cameron, ―A Coup is a Coup is a Coup,‖ The Mark, October 
13, 2009 http://www.themarknews.com/articles/568-a-coup-is-a-coup-is-
a-coup.(accessed February 8, 2011). 
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unconstitutional suspension of the constitution by a sitting 
executive (as in Peru in 1992). 
 
If constitutional government is government of laws that limit 
power according to democratic checks and balances, it seems 
right to define a coup as the overthrow of constitutional 
government. Such an overthrow must, by definition, be 
unconstitutional. From this perspective, a ―constitutional 
coup‖ would be an oxymoron, because constitutional 
government cannot constitute its own overthrow.
26
 
 
The standard view is widely accepted, and is also embedded 
in the most significant international mechanism protecting 
against coups in Latin America: the Inter-American 
Democratic Charter stipulates that ―an unconstitutional 
interruption of the democratic order or an unconstitutional 
alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs 
the democratic order in a member state, constitutes, while it 
persists, an insurmountable obstacle to its government‘s 
participation [as a member of the OAS].‖ The Charter does 
not define an ―interruption or alteration,‖ but the broad 
outlines are reasonably clear. Through the Charter, the OAS 
can legitimately exert pressure on states that experience not 
only interruptions of democracy such as military coups, but 
also alterations such as the arbitrary dismissal of the 
legislature or the judiciary by a sitting president (a ―self-
coup‖, such as Alberto Fujimori‘s in Peru in 199227).  
 
The Charter does not clarify what is and isn‘t constitutional, 
yet from the perspective of the standard view, we might 
assume this to be unproblematic. If a coup is ―a change in the 
constitutional order by non-constitutional means‖, a coup is 
by definition unconstitutional and hence a legitimate reason 
to trigger the Charter and mobilize the OAS to resist it. 
                                                 
26
 Cameron (ibid.) argues that the constitutional coup concept ―has no 
place in law or scholarship‖. 
27
 See Maxwell A. Cameron, ―Self-Coups: Peru, Guatemala and Russia,‖ 
Journal of Democracy 9:1 (1998), pp. 125-39. 
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There are two important reasons to question the standard 
view, however, and along with it the assumption it imposes 
on the Charter: 
 
First, constitutions and constitutional orders are not the same 
thing. All states are a type of constitutional order, insofar as 
they are ―constituted‖ in some form. Most states also have a 
constitution of some sort, but constitutions can differ from 
constitutional orders. Constitutions specify the terms under 
which a constitutional order functions. They are usually 
(though not always) written documents, which contain 
provisions for how authorities can exercise power in a wide 
range of possible circumstances. A constitutional coup is 
indeed an oxymoron if ―constitutional‖ refers to the 
constitutional order. A constitutional order cannot overthrow 
itself. But if ―constitutional‖ refers to the constitution instead 
of the constitutional order—then a different set of 
possibilities arises.  
 
This becomes evident in the second reason to question the 
standard assumption, which is that most constitutions contain 
provisions for the suspension of basic constitutional 
guarantees, including core rights and freedoms. Such ―states 
of exception‖ are exercised in times of emergency, such as 
wars, insurrections or natural disasters. Constitutions can 
give officials, such as presidents, extraordinary powers to 
suspend basic rights and freedoms, or ordinary government 
procedures, or both.  In some constitutions states of 
exception are limited, and provide clear mechanisms for 
oversight (such as by the other branches of government). But 
other constitutions permit broader suspensions, with less 
oversight. Historically, Latin American constitutions have 
granted executives a great deal of power, with very limited 
oversight in times of crisis. And they have also granted 
similar kinds of power to the armed forces, especially by 
giving them the responsibility to act as the ―guarantors‖ of 
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the constitutional order.
28
 When executives can assume 
absolute or near absolute power, or when the armed forces 
have the mandate to guarantee the constitutional order, a 
constitutional coup is no longer an oxymoron. A president 
can rule without constraints based on powers granted in the 
constitution, and the armed forces can overthrow a 
government for the purpose of protecting the constitutional 
order. 
 
This is not simply a matter of purely theoretical concern, or a 
past problem that has little contemporary relevance. A 
number of contemporary issues underscore the constitutional 
coup threat in Latin America:  
 
 The 2009 coup against Honduran President Manuel 
Zelaya by the armed forces with the support of the 
Congress and the Supreme Court, for the purpose of 
protecting the constitution. The OAS argued that the 
coup was clearly unconstitutional and on the basis of 
the Inter-American Democratic Charter suspended 
Honduras. A sober assessment reveals that the 
Honduran constitution contains provisions supporting 
both the OAS‘s position, along with that of the group 
that overthrew Zelaya, which produced a 
constitutional crisis. Yet Honduran constitution, in 
granting the armed forces the power to act as 
guarantors of the constitutional order, contributed to 
the coup.
29
 
                                                 
28
 For a history of these provisions in Latin American constitutions, see 
Brian Loveman, The Constitution of Tyranny (University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1993). 
29
 For a more detailed analysis of how the Honduran constitution 
contributed to the crisis and the coup, see Pablo Policzer, ―The Next 
Stage of Democracy Promotion,‖ Canadian Foundation for the Americas 
(FOCAL) Policy Brief, July 2010: http://www.focal.ca/publications/156-
policy-papers-briefs; and Antonio Franceschet and Pablo Policzer, 
―Taking Constitutions Seriously: International Democracy Promotion 
After Honduras,‖ University of Calgary, Unpublished manuscript, 2011. 
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 In December 2010 the Venezuelan Congress granted 
President Hugo Chávez an ―enabling law‖, allowing 
him to govern by decree for a period of 18 months. 
This law was one of the last acts of the outgoing 
Congress, controlled by pro-Chávez forces. In the 
incoming Congress opposition groups gained enough 
seats to remove Chávez‘s two-third ―super majority.‖ 
The enabling law was passed ostensibly to deal with 
the natural disasters caused by very heavy rains, but 
it essentially grants Chávez the power to rule without 
constraint from the opposition, which has gained 
seats in the new Congress. The OAS has declared 
that the enabling law contravenes the terms of the 
Inter-American Democratic Charter, which would 
mean the law is unconstitutional. Yet while the law is 
certainly undemocratic, it is based on particular 
constitutional provisions allowing Congress to grant 
such power to the President, which the Venezuelan 
Congress has done in the past. While Chávez has not 
taken unlimited power for an indefinite period of 
time, he has removed the important check and 
balance of Congressional oversight, and done so on 
the basis of the Venezuelan Constitution. 
 
 The Ecuadorian constitution also gives the President 
a potentially similar kind of power. In the event of a 
conflict between the Executive and Legislative 
branches, the President can end the mandate of both 
the Congress and the Presidency, yet continue to rule 
until the next scheduled elections (in which the 
president is allowed to run). In that interim period the 
president assumes full legislative faculties, meaning 
the ability to rule without congressional oversight. 
Analysts have pointed out that using this 
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constitutional faculty would turn the president into a 
virtual dictator.
30
  
 
 In 2010 a general in the Venezuelan armed forces 
indicated that the military would not accept an 
opposition victory in the next presidential elections, 
scheduled for 2012. Such a declaration certainly 
violates the Constitution‘s stipulation that the 
military is a professional and non-political institution 
(Art. 328), but is consistent with the fundamental 
Constitutional principle that Venezuela is a 
Bolivarian Republic (Art. 1), which would preclude 
the occupation of the Presidency by a candidate from 
an opposition non-Bolivarian party.
31
  
 
 A number of constitutions in the region have similar 
language regarding the status of the armed forces. 
Article 142 of the Brazilian Constitution states that 
the military is ―under the supreme authority of the 
President of the Republic,‖ yet also that its mission is 
to ―guarantee the constitutional powers.‖ Article 217 
of the Colombian Constitution states that the mandate 
of the armed forces is to defend the ―constitutional 
order‖.32  
                                                 
30
 See Simon Pachano, ―Insubordinación y Muerte Cruzada,‖ Infolatam, 
September 30, 2010 (http://www.infolatam.com/2010/09/30/ecuador-
insubordinacion-y-muerte-cruzada/; accessed February 10, 2011). 
31
 OAS Secretary General José Miguel Insulza has warned that such 
threats are unacceptable and run counter to the democratic principles 
embodied in the Inter-American Democratic Charter. President Chávez 
has promoted the general in question 
(http://www.infolatam.com/2010/11/14/venezuela-chavez-asciende-al-
general-rangel-tras-sus-amenazas-si-ganase-la-oposicion/; 
http://noticias.latino.msn.com/latinoamerica/articulos.aspx?cp-
documentid=26528647; both accessed February 12, 2011). 
32
 The Chilean Constitution contained a similar provision (in Article 90, 
which stipulated that the military‘s mandate was to guarantee the 
constitutional order), but this was removed in 2005 as part of a set of 
constitutional reforms. 
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One possible response to these threats is to suggest that the 
countries of the hemisphere must close ranks in defense of 
democracy, according to the terms of the Inter-American 
Democratic Charter. The premise of this position is that the 
mechanisms for the defense of democracy in the region are 
clear, and that only mustering sufficient political will to 
implement them is required. While the OAS has signaled its 
interest in improving some aspects of the Charter,33 it has 
ignored the problem of violations to democracy stemming 
from within the region‘s own constitutions. As suggested 
here, these provisions create the conditions for a 
constitutional crisis, as in Honduras, or open the door to the 
exercise of constitutional authoritarianism, as in Venezuela 
or other countries. It makes little sense to define the problem 
away by ruling out ex-ante the possibility of a constitutional 
coup. When executives or the military take absolute power, 
even temporarily, based on provisions in the constitution, 
they are staging a constitutional coup. But how should we 
define a coup in order to make sense of this very real threat? 
 
A NEW DEFINITION FOR COUPS 
 
Instead of defining the problem away (by thinking of a coup 
as an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional order), 
an alternative is to define a coup as a transformation of 
limited into absolute power. This transformation need not be 
permanent, and it need not be quick, but what distinguishes a 
coup is the concentration of absolute power, usually by 
removing democratic checks and balances. Coups can be 
constitutional or unconstitutional. It is always possible for an 
actor to take and concentrate power unconstitutionally. But if 
a constitution stipulates that actors such as executives or the 
military under some conditions can exercise absolute power, 
it is reasonable and not an oxymoron to call this a 
constitutional coup. Coups are not the same as emergency 
powers or states of exception, although they can be related. 
                                                 
33 For example, to allow other institutions besides the Executive of the 
country in question to invoke the Charter. 
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A democratic state of exception stipulates strict limits on 
(usually) executive power in times of crisis. State of 
exception provisions that do not stipulate such limits create 
the conditions for a constitutional coup. 
 
Limited and absolute power are opposite ends along a 
continuum, where any number of configurations may be 
possible. A regime can move gradually along this 
continuum, and slide toward the concentration of power. If 
that slide toward absolute power is based on constitutional 
provisions, the regime can experience a constitutional coup 
in slow motion. 
 
Through the Inter-American Democratic Charter, the 
member states of the OAS have defended themselves against 
an ―unconstitutional alteration or interruption to the 
democratic order.‖ But the Charter defines away the problem 
of constitutional coups: constitutional alterations or 
interruptions, which result in undemocratic concentrations of 
power. In some cases these may be a more serious threat to 
democracy, given the provisions for authoritarian 
concentration of power embedded throughout some of the 
region‘s constitutions. Strengthening democracy will require 
addressing this blind spot, and reforming the undemocratic 
provisions in many of the region‘s constitutions. 
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Can Coups Still Take Place 
in Latin America?  
 
Dr. Michael Shifter 
Inter-American Dialogue 
(Washington, DC) 
 
It has been two decades since the military forcibly ousted an 
elected, civilian government in Latin America and the 
Caribbean and actually assumed and exercised full authority.  
Such a traditional coup scenario took place in Haiti in 1991; 
prior to that, one would have to go back to Argentina in 
1976.   By any historical measure that is an impressive 
stretch of time that reflects well on the region‘s democratic 
progress.  
 
Yet, though surely significant, the fact that a military regime 
is not in control anywhere in the region today is hardly cause 
for celebration.   Elections are, happily, routine, and have 
become the only acceptable way of achieving legitimacy.   
But the last two decades have witnessed a number of cases of 
governments whose legal terms were interrupted, serious 
aberrations in democratic rule, and significant weakening of 
fundamental institutions.   
 
Indeed, there has been a string of interruptions of democratic 
rule in which leaders were deposed by extra-constitutional 
means.  There is reason to believe such interruptions -- some 
of which certainly qualify as coups – will continue to take 
place in some Latin American countries in the future.   
 
Less than a year after Haiti‘s traditional coup came the ―self-
coup‖ engineered by elected Peruvian president Alberto 
Fujimori, who proceeded to dissolve the Congress and 
suspend the constitution.  And the most recent illustration 
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was the 2009 Honduras situation that in some respects 
recalled a traditional military coup, even though the armed 
forces did not take power but rather quickly ceded to a de 
facto government. 
 
In both the Peruvian and Honduran examples (as well as 
Haiti) there was a strong reaction from other democratic 
hemispheric governments (in the case of Honduras the 
response was particularly severe and resulted in the 
country‘s expulsion from the Organization of American 
States (OAS).   But other instances in which governments 
that were ousted by force barely elicited any response from 
multilateral organizations.  Street mobilizations forced 
Bolivian president Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada to leave the 
presidency in October 2003, yet few referred to what 
happened as a coup.   
 
Ecuador most clearly exemplifies the view that whether or 
not a challenge to democratic rule is dealt with as a coup is 
less a result of some rigorous, consistently applied definition 
than the politics that surrounds the situation.  Arguably in 
several instances in Ecuador -- including in 1997, 2000 and 
particularly in 2005 – democratically elected governments 
were forced out, and at least in two of those cases the armed 
forces played the role of final arbiter.    
 
Yet, prevailing regional politics -- along with the nature and 
politics of the coup itself -- were not conducive to any 
serious response by other hemispheric governments.  At the 
same time, in late September 2010 there was essentially a 
police uprising that generated a strong response (even if one 
was not really warranted) and was characterized as a coup, 
not only by the OAS but also the Community of South 
American Nations or UNASUR.   In some cases a coup took 
place but was not described as such, whereas another case 
was deemed a coup though it is not clear one occurred.   
 
Whether a legitimate, elected government is forcibly ousted 
by Congress (Ecuador 1997), the street (Bolivia 2003) or the 
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military (Honduras 2009), such coups or interruptions are 
highly problematic and repeatedly reveal the extreme 
fragility of democratic institutions in a half dozen or so of 
Latin American countries.   Electoral processes may have 
improved in many respects, but in some nations the rule of 
law and judicial systems remain deficient, and Congress and 
political parties are extremely weak and incoherent.   In these 
countries, which tend to have chronic governance 
difficulties, there are good reasons to expect future coups, 
particularly if economic and social conditions deteriorate. 
 
In addition, there is another kind of phenomenon that can 
aptly be described as a coup as well – and that does not 
necessarily involve any change in government.  Some 
analysts have referred to ―slow-motion‖ coups in such 
countries as Nicaragua and Venezuela, where elected 
presidents proceed to systematically concentrate power and 
display disdain for democratic institutions and independent 
powers of government.  In some respects, these cases 
resemble the characteristics of Fujimori in Peru in the 1990s.   
Nicaragua‘s Daniel Ortega, elected president in 2006, has 
dismantled any checks on his power and presided over local 
elections widely deemed to be fraudulent.   
 
In Venezuela, Hugo Chavez represents an extreme case, in 
which democratic norms and practices have been 
progressively subverted.  The latest example is a set of laws, 
passed by a lame duck, Chavez-controlled National 
Assembly that gives Chavez decree authority for some 
eighteen months.  Though the April 2002 short-lived coup 
against Chavez produced a strong reaction by the 
hemispheric community, the significant violations of his own 
1999 constitution have met with a tepid response at best 
outside of Venezuela.   Chavez‘s regime, markedly 
militarized and contemptuous of the rule of law, faces scant 
external pressure.         
 
Unless the politics are aligned (as was the case in Honduras 
in June 2009), there otherwise seems to be less and less 
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appetite among regional bodies such as the OAS to take 
forceful action in response to coups of whatever kind.   In 
September 2011, the Inter-American Democratic Charter, 
which codified all of the OAS instruments and declarations 
regarding the defense of democracy in the Americas, will 
mark its first decade.   The instruments and framework are 
highly developed, and were fashioned in response to the 
Fujimori experience (beyond the 1992 ―self-coup‖) in Peru, 
where the Charter was signed by the hemisphere‘s 
democratically elected governments.   
 
But unfortunately in recent years the collective will in the 
Americas to apply the instruments in accordance with some 
consistent standards and criteria has eroded.  Among the 
region‘s countries that have experienced democratic progress 
such as Chile and Brazil there is no support for the situations 
of strongman rule in such countries as Nicaragua and 
Venezuela.  At the same time, however, arguments about 
sovereignty and non-intervention are frequently invoked to 
justify inaction.    
 
Coups of some kind should be expected in Latin America in 
coming years not only because fundamental institutions 
remain weak in some countries but because the regional 
political environment is less prepared to respond effectively 
to transgressions than it was a few years ago.   The good 
news, however, is that only a handful of countries are at risk, 
and that the militaries, even in those countries, show no 
interest in governing.  The bad news is that in those few 
countries where situations are indeed shaky, they are also in 
some cases aggravated by rising food and fuel prices, and 
spreading criminality, which pose serious risks to the rule of 
law and democratic governance. 
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